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In this article, the first of a series of four articles that engage critically with the arguments 
of two recent and significant additions to the literature on critical realism, namely 
Bhaskar’s Enlightened Common Sense: The Philosophy of Critical Realism and Bhaskar 
et al.’s Interdisciplinarity and Wellbeing: A Critical Realist General Theory of 
Interdisciplinarity. Using the method of immanent critique and focusing mainly, but not 
exclusively, on the arguments of Enlightened Common Sense, I identify, and propose 
solutions to, a range of problems pertaining to the concepts of depth, emergence and 
transfactuality. In identifying and resolving these problems, my aim is to clarify and 
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develop the categories of original critical realism and thereby ensure that critical realism 
as a whole is as effective an underlabourer for science as it can be. 
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1. Introduction 
Enlightened Common Sense: The Philosophy of Critical Realism (hereafter ECS) and 
Interdisciplinarity and Wellbeing: A Critical Realist General Theory of Interdisciplinarity 
(hereafter IW) constitute two recent and significant additions to an expanding corpus of 
academic work that both develops and draws on the philosophy of critical realism. Although 
the focus and scope of the arguments of the two books differ, taken together they may be seen 
as complementary in the sense of reflecting (approximately) the relationship between 
(philosophical) theory and (scientific) practice. Thus, whereas ECS is a contribution to the 
development of critical realism considered as a body of theory, IW is concerned primarily with 
demonstrating the value of the application of critical realist theory to the development of a 
genuinely interdisciplinary approach to scientific research on human wellbeing. Indeed, there 
is a considerable amount of overlap between the two books: for example, Chapters 4 to 8 of IW 
constitute a summary of the core categories of original and dialectical critical realism, which is 
also the focus of Chapters 1 to 5 (original critical realism) and Chapters 6 to 7 (dialectical 
critical realism) of ECS, while Chapter 4 of ECS is concerned with the application of critical 
realism to scientific inquiry and with developing an ontological justification for 
interdisciplinary scientific research, which is also the focus of the second and third parts of IW.1  
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It is the existence of this degree of overlap between the two books that justifies their joint 
consideration in this article, the first of a series of four distinct, yet connected, articles that 
engage critically with the philosophy of critical realism, both as a body of theory and in 
application to scientific practice. In the first and second articles in this series, my focus is on 
the arguments of ECS, as the intended outcome of my critical engagement is the clarification 
and development of some of the theoretical categories of original critical realism (depth, 
emergence, transfactuality, intransitivity and domains of reality). By contrast, in the third and 
fourth articles, my focus moves from the arguments of ECS to the arguments of IW, as the 
intended outcome is the clarification and development of the concepts of theoretical and applied 
critical realism, and interdisciplinarity, in the third article, and the clarification and development 
of a critical realist approach to interdisciplinary research on human wellbeing, in the fourth. 
However, given the degree of overlap between the two books, I consider, where appropriate, 
arguments from both ECS and IW in each of the four articles in this series. I also bring into 
consideration, where appropriate, relevant arguments from other works in the field of critical 
realism – for example, the work of Hartwig (2007).   
 
What is significant about ECS and thus of value to those who are new to the philosophy of 
critical realism is that, to the best of my knowledge, it is the only work in which Roy Bhaskar, 
the originator of critical realism, presents a ‘lucid distillation’ of the three, core elements of this 
philosophy: original or basic critical realism, dialectical critical realism and the philosophy of 
metaReality (xii). Indeed, the way in which Bhaskar has communicated his system of 
philosophy in the writing of ECS – ‘achieving a high level of simplicity and clarity without 
sacrificing profundity’ – must surely give this book a wide appeal (xii). As Hartwig points out 
in the Preface, given the personal circumstances of Bhaskar’s writing, this was a remarkable 
achievement. However, as Hartwig also explains, ECS is not a simple ‘summary’ of the 
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philosophy of critical realism; rather, it is a ‘summative’ work – that is, it ‘adds to and enhances’ 
an existing body of theoretical work at the same time as (necessarily) ‘recapitulating it’ (xiv, 
fn. 3); and it is because ECS is a work of theoretical development as well as a recapitulation 
that the title of the manuscript was changed from Critical Realism in a Nutshell: An 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Critical Realism to Enlightened Common Sense: The 
Philosophy of Critical Realism (xiv, fn. 3). However, it is for this reason, I suggest, that ECS 
will also be of interest to more experienced critical realists. 
 
As Hartwig acknowledges in the Preface to ECS, the phrase ‘enlightened common sense’ 
appears at the start of Chapter 1 of Reclaiming Reality, a book that was first published in 1989 
and that, in its own way, may be regarded as a summative contribution to the philosophy of 
critical realism (xiv, fn. 5). Bhaskar’s message in Chapter 1 of that earlier work was a political 
one: he called for ‘the building of a movement for socialism … so that it becomes the 
enlightened common-sense of our age’ (2011, 1). However, in my view, if socialism is to 
become hegemonic politically, critical realism must also become ‘the enlightened common-
sense of our age’ not least because, by virtue of its role ‘as an underlabourer for science and 
projects of human emancipation’, critical realism enables us to ensure that our social theorizing 
is in line with our social practices and to ensure that our political positions, and the policies that 
flow from them, are in line with our scientific understanding of society (Bhaskar 2011, 2). In 
other words, an understanding of critical realism can help us to distinguish genuine social 
science and genuine ‘projects of human emancipation’ from those which are not. Therefore, in 
my view, it is entirely appropriate that, in ECS, Bhaskar should refer to the philosophy of critical 
realism as ‘enlightened common sense’ and as ‘an agent of emancipatory change’ (5). 
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However, if critical realism is to be an effective underlabourer – if, as Bhaskar writes in Chapter 
2 of ECS, it is to ‘demystify and enlighten common sense’ by revealing inconsistencies between 
theory and practice (amongst other things) – it must be as coherent an account of reality and 
hence, in its own way, as consistent with practice as it can be (38). Indeed, given that ECS is a 
‘distillation’ of critical realism as a system of philosophy, it is surely important that we ensure 
that it is a coherent system and that the content of each of the three, core elements is consistent, 
if we want to avoid the possibility of conceptual and theoretical confusion arising in the minds 
of (for example) scientists who are engaging with critical realism in an effort to understand and 
resolve a problem with their practice.2 
 
Therefore, my aim in this article is to resolve a range of conceptual problems – for example, 
illicit conceptual identification and split, conceptual absence, and contradictory conceptual 
definition – that I have detected, using the method of immanent critique, in the arguments of 
ECS and IW and, by implication, in the arguments of Bhaskar’s earlier works.3 By suggesting 
how these conceptual problems might be resolved (through, for example, taxonomic statement 
and re-statement of the relations between concepts, which involves both conceptual 
differentiation and conceptual integration), I show not only how our understanding of some of 
the categories of original critical realism might be clarified but also how this understanding 
might be developed. Moreover, I approach the question of identifying and resolving such 
problems from the perspective of dialectical critical realism to ensure that there is a coherent 
relationship between the categories of original and the categories of dialectical critical realism.4 
If the latter presuppose the former, as the editor points out in the Preface to ECS, the theory of 
original critical realism must be consistent with the theory of dialectical critical realism, if 
critical realism as a whole is to make sense (xii).5  
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Therefore, I have organized my argument as follows. In Section 2, I clarify the distinctions 
between, as well as the connections of, the concepts of depth, stratification, structuration and 
emergence, and the principle of non-identity, in light of the arguments that Bhaskar presents in 
Chapters 1 to 3 of ECS and the authors of IW present in Chapter 4. In Section 3, my aim is more 
ambitious: I attempt, not only to clarify the understanding of emergence that is summarized in 
Chapter 2 of ECS and Chapter 7 of IW but also to develop our understanding of this concept. 
Hence, I present a more thorough diffraction of the concept of emergence, defending 
distinctions between (a) ontic and epistemic emergence, (b) ontological and epistemological 
emergence, (c) synchronic and diachronic emergence, (d) material, conceptual, and semiotic 
emergence, (e) functional and compositional emergence, and (f) super-impositional and intra-
positional emergence. In Section 4, I discuss the principle of transfactuality, taking Bhaskar’s 
discussion of the criteria for emergence in Chapters 2 and 3 of ECS as my starting point. I argue 
that the causal criteria for compositional and functional emergence must include, respectively, 
the concepts of causal and functional interdependence. In the final section of the article, I 
summarize my argument.6  
 
2. Depth, Stratification, Structuration, Emergence, and Non-Identity 
In Chapter 3.2 of ECS, Bhaskar elaborates ‘three new kinds of ontological distance or depth in 
transcendental realism’, which are ‘Intransitivity’, ‘Transfactuality’, and ‘Stratification’, and, 
in doing so, refers to the content of Chapter 2 (47-51). I have three points to make about this 
(internal) reference as well as the argument of Chapter 3.2. 
 
My first point has to do with the concept of depth. I suggest that we should be careful not to 
confuse the concept of depth with the concept of stratification because the latter is a specific 
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type of the former (that is, vertical depth) and, as such, should not be treated as synonymous 
with it. Hence, Bhaskar’s reference to the content of Chapter 2 at this point in the text of ECS 
may be confusing to those who are less familiar with the categories of original critical realism 
because, in Chapter 2.4, Bhaskar defines, not ‘three new kinds of ontological distance or depth’ 
but ‘[t]hree senses of stratification’ and, in doing so, leaves the reader with the impression that 
the concepts of depth and stratification are synonymous (31-2). My first point, then, is that we 
should make a clear analytical distinction between the concept of depth and the concept of 
stratification. Because these concepts are not synonymous, they should not be identified with 
one another; the relationship between them is one of ‘constellational identity’ and not one of 
simple identity (Bhaskar 2008b, 114-15). 
 
My second point concerns the principle of non-identity and the concepts of stratification and 
structuration. In Chapter 1.2 of ECS, Bhaskar refers to ‘the simple stratification implied by the 
distinction between structures (generative mechanisms and so forth) and the patterns of events 
(or the domains of the real and the actual)’ (7); in Chapter 2.4 of ECS, he tells us, similarly, that 
the ‘first sense of stratification turns … on the distinction between structures and events or 
between the domains of the real and the actual’ (32); and, in Chapter 3.2, he refers, once again, 
to the concept of stratification in passing: 
 
 A transcendental argument from the conditions of possibility of experimentation in 
 science thus establishes at once the irreducibility of ontology … to epistemology and a 
 novel non-empiricist but non-rationalist, non-actualist stratified and differentiated 
 ontology; that is, an ontology characterized by the existence of structures as well as 
 events (stratification) and open systems as well as closed ones (differentiation). (46) 
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However, it seems to me that to speak of ‘the distinction between structures … and the patterns 
of events’ and to compare this distinction to the distinction between ‘the domains of the real 
and the actual’ is to presuppose, not the concept of stratification, which refers to emergence of 
entities at distinct, yet connected, levels of reality, but the principle of non-identity or difference 
that is constitutive of the First Moment (1M) of dialectical critical realism. After all, one of 
Bhaskar’s aims in A Realist Theory of Science (2008a) was to establish, against both empiricism 
and actualism, that we can identify neither the domain of the empirical with the domain of the 
real nor the domain of the actual with the domain of the real. Instead he suggests that there is a 
constellational identity of the domain of the empirical with the domain of the actual; and a 
constellational identity of the domain of the actual with the domain of the real.  
 
However, I suggest that, in these passages Bhaskar is presupposing, not only the principle of 
non-identity but also the concept of structuration – that is, the process through which reality 
becomes structured.7 This interpretation is consistent, both with Bhaskar’s frequent references 
in ECS to the structuring of reality and to the ‘substantive content’ (which includes the concept 
of structuration) of the First Moment of dialectical critical realism (Hartwig 2007, 297, Table 
29). For example, in Chapter 1.4 of ECS, Bhaskar tells us that he is arguing ‘for the development 
of a new ontology, in which structure, differentiation and change move to the fore’ (4); in 
Chapter 2.1, he tells us that his aim is ‘to establish a new non-Humean ontology, committed to 
the reality of structure, difference and change against actualism’ (25); and, in Chapter 2.3, he 
tells us that ‘the critical realist ontology is structured, differentiated and … susceptible to 
change’ (27).8  
 
Moreover, in Chapter 4 of IW, the authors present a similar argument, under a different sub-
heading (‘Three senses in which reality is structured’), but confuse the concept of structuration 
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with (a) the concept of the three domains of reality and (b) the concept of stratification. For 
example, they write: 
 
 Up to this point, we have isolated two senses in which critical realism describes reality 
 as being structured. First, there is a sense in which you need a distinction between the 
 real and the actual. The necessity of this is the existence of real structures and 
 mechanisms that are irreducible to the actual patterns of events. Second, there is the 
 sense in which reality has a multi-tiered stratification. (30) 
 
Once again, the problem here is that the concept of structuration has a meaning that is distinct 
from that of (a) the concept of domains of reality and (b) the concept of stratification. If we 
confuse these concepts, we will be in danger of not understanding, first, that the stratification 
of reality depends on the process of structuration (and superstructuration) because, as we shall 
see in Section 3, the entities that emerge at distinct levels of reality are structures (and 
superstructures); and, second, that the real and the actual are overlapping domains in the sense 
that the domain of the real constellationally contains both structures and events and so that the 
distinction between structures and events is not synonymous, and thus should not be identified, 
with the distinction between the domain of the real and the domain of the actual.  
 
In short, my second point is that it is important that we distinguish clearly between (a) the 
principle of non-identity, (b) the concept of stratification, and (c) the concept of structuration. 
We cannot treat these categories of thought as being synonymous because they have distinct 
meanings.  
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My third point has to do with the concept of emergence. Both Bhaskar, in ECS, and the authors 
of IW confuse the concept of emergence with the concept of stratification. For example, in 
Chapter 2.4 of ECS, Bhaskar defines a ‘third sense of stratification’, which is a ‘special case of 
this multi-tiered stratification that consists in emergence’ (32); similarly, in Chapter 4 of IW, 
the authors refer to ‘a third fundamental kind of stratification, or inflection to the idea of 
stratification, which is emergence’ (30). However, as we shall see in Section 3, the concept of 
emergence has a meaning that is distinct from that of stratification; indeed, the latter depends 
on the former because it is through the process of emergence and, by implication, the processes 
of structuration (and superstructuration), transformative negation, and causal (and functional) 
interdependence, that material (and ideational) entities lying at distinct levels of reality become 
connected. (Moreover, if causal objects are emergent at distinct levels of reality, and if causal 
objects emergent at the same level of reality may be distinguished by function – as we shall 
also see in Section 3 – not only the stratification but also the differentiation of reality is 
dependent on the process of emergence.) 
 
In short, my third point is that we should make a clear analytical distinction between the concept 
of stratification and the concept of emergence, whilst recognizing the connection between the 
two. Hence, only the ‘second sense’ of stratification that Bhaskar defines in Chapter 2.4 of ECS 
– that which ‘consists in the kind of multi-tiered stratification of reality revealed in the 
development of science’ – corresponds to the elaborated definition of stratification that Bhaskar 
sets out in Chapter 3.2 (48-51). 
 
Therefore, to avoid any danger of conceptual confusion, we should respect the principle of non-
identity that is constitutive of the First Moment of dialectical critical realism and make clear 
analytical distinctions between 
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(a) the concept of depth and the concept of stratification, since stratification is a specific type 
of depth; 
(b) the concept of structuration and the concept of stratification, since the stratification of reality 
depends on the structuring of reality; 
(c) the concept of emergence and the concept of stratification, since the stratification of reality 
depends on the emergence of structured entities at distinct levels of reality; 
(d) the concept of domains of reality and the concepts of stratification and structuration, since 
the division of reality into three overlapping domains is an instantiation of the principle of non-
identity, whereas the concept of stratification refers to the emergence of structures (and 
superstructures) at distinct levels of reality and thus depends on the concept of structuration 
(and superstructuration). 
 
3. Emergence 
In Chapter 2.4 of ECS, Bhaskar introduces a distinction between ‘ontological’ and ‘epistemic’ 
emergence and tells us that ‘it is important to distinguish synchronic from diachronic 
emergence’ (32). These conceptual distinctions raise the question of whether or not 
‘ontological’ emergence can be paired with ‘epistemic’ emergence, given the meaning of the 
terms ‘ontological’ and ‘epistemic’ that we find in Bhaskar’s earlier work, and of whether or 
not, by using the term ‘synchronic’ and ‘diachronic’ in relation to emergence, Bhaskar is 
referring to distinct types of emergence. These are just some of the questions that I attempt to 
answer in this section, as I unravel the different meanings of emergence. 
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3.1 Ontic and epistemic emergence 
As Bhaskar implies in Chapter 1 of Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, the term 
‘epistemic’ refers to knowledge (2009, 36-8). However, we can refine the meaning of this term 
further, as Hartwig has done, and distinguish between epistemic1 – ‘whatever pertains to 
knowledge generally’ – and epistemic2 – ‘the transitive process or product of some specific, 
historically determinate, scientific or other empirically based investigation’ (2007, 178). For 
example, scientific theory, in general, is an epistemic1 entity, whereas a specific theory – such 
as Marx’s theory of value – that is the product of the scientific process is an epistemic2 entity. 
Hence, epistemic1 emergence ought to refer to the process by which knowledge of reality, in 
general, emerges, whereas epistemic2 emergence ought to refer to the process by which a 
specific form of knowledge emerges. For example, the development of new scientific theory 
(epistemic1 emergence) depends (in part) on the immanent critique of existing scientific theory, 
while it is arguable that the development of Marx’s theory of value (an example of epstemic2 
emergence) depended (in part) on Marx’s immanent critique of theories of classical political 
economy.9  
 
By contrast, the term ‘ontic’ refers to that which exists (Bhaskar 2009, 36-8). However, once 
again, we can refine the meaning of this term further, as Hartwig has done, and distinguish 
between ontic1 – ‘whatever pertains to being generally’ – and ontic2 – ‘the INTRANSITIVE object 
of some specific, historically determinate, scientific or other empirically based investigation’ 
(2007, 178). For example, a structure is an ontic1 entity because it ‘pertains to being generally’, 
whereas the capitalist system of production is an ontic2 entity because it is ‘the intransitive 
object of … [social] scientific … investigation.’ Hence, ontic1 emergence ought to refer to the 
process by which real objects, in general, (such as structures) emerge, while ontic2 emergence 
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ought to refer to the process by which a specific real object that is under scientific investigation 
(such as the capitalist system of production) emerged. 
 
Therefore, just as we can distinguish between epistemic1 and epistemic2 entities and between 
ontic1 and ontic2 entities, so we can distinguish between the corresponding processes of 
epistemic1 and epistemic2 emergence and ontic1 and ontic2 emergence. Now, if knowledge is 
constellationally contained within reality, it follows that both epistemic1 and epistemic2 entities 
fall within the domain of ontic1 (but not ontic2) entities and that both epistemic1 and epistemic2 
emergence fall within the domain of ontic1 (but not ontic2) emergence.
10 In short, the first point 
that I want to make is that epistemic emergence must be paired with ontic, not ontological, 
emergence because the epistemic is constellationally contained within, and therefore logically 
associated with, the ontic. 
 
However, the second point that I want to make about the concept of epistemic emergence is 
that it reminds us that, in addition to recognizing the possibility of material emergence, we must 
recognize the possibility of conceptual emergence because the development of knowledge 
(epistemic1 emergence) depends (in part) on the formation and re-formation of (scientific and 
philosophical) concepts and their higher-order derivatives – principles, theories, and paradigms. 
Furthermore, I suggest that a distinction between material and conceptual emergence is 
valuable, if it helps us to avoid committing, what I call (in the second article in this series) the 
epistemological fallacy; for, we are in danger of committing this fallacy, if, in our explanations 
of emergence, we assume that material emergence and, by implication, compositional 
emergence, is the only type of emergence. As we shall see below, this is an untenable 
assumption because reality is characterized, not only by material but also by ideational 
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(conceptual and semiotic) emergence and not only by compositional but also by functional 
emergence. 
 
3.2 Ontological and epistemological emergence 
Just as we can distinguish between ontic and epistemic emergence, so we can distinguish 
between ontological and epistemological emergence and their refined meanings. When we are 
considering emergence as a principle or proposition within a theory of being, we should refer 
to ontological emergence. More precisely, we should distinguish between ontological1 
emergence, when we are referring to emergence as a proposition ‘in the general (philosophical) 
theory of being, or what pertains to it’, and ontological2 emergence, when we are referring to 
emergence as a proposition ‘in the transcendental theory [of reality] constituted by reflection 
on the presuppositions of scientific activities, or what pertains to it’ (Bhaskar 2009, 36). 
Likewise, when we are considering emergence as a principle or proposition within a theory of 
knowledge, we should refer to epistemological emergence. More precisely, we should 
distinguish between epistemological1 emergence, when we are referring to emergence as a 
proposition ‘in the general theory of KNOWLEDGE’, and epistemological2 emergence, when we 
are referring to emergence as a proposition ‘in the transcendental theory of knowledge 
constituted by reflection on the presuppositions of scientific and other activities’ (Hartwig 2007, 
178). 
 
Now, if epistemology is constellationally contained within ontology, epistemological1 and 
epistemological2 emergence fall within the domain of ontological1 (but not ontological2) 
emergence. In short, the point that I am making here is that ontological emergence must be 
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paired with epistemological, not epistemic, emergence because the epistemological is 
constellationally contained within, and therefore logically associated with, the ontological.  
 
3.3 Synchronic and diachronic emergence 
So far, I have distinguished between different types of emergence (ontic and epistemic) and 
between different propositional orders of emergence (the ontological and epistemological). 
However, in Chapter 2.4 of ECS, Bhaskar also distinguishes between ‘synchronic’ and 
‘diachronic’ emergence. He writes:  
 
 In order to get a good handle on ontological emergence, it is important to distinguish 
 synchronic from diachronic emergence, and focus on the former; that is, to look at the 
 relationship between the emergent or higher-order and the lower-order levels of reality 
 once the emergent level has been constituted. (32) 
 
But, in defending this distinction in this way, Bhaskar is presupposing that the terms synchronic 
and diachronic refer to distinct types of emergence. But do they? 
 
Emergence is a process through which new entities come into being; as such, it presupposes 
absence. As Bhaskar argues in Chapter 6.2 of ECS,  
 
 in the case of emergent entities … change, involving a transformation or rupture at 
 that level cannot be accounted for/explained totally in terms of an internal 
 redistribution or external events, but must be explained at least in part by internal 
 novelty or transformation, that is, as involving absenting … (118)  
This is the accepted version of an article that has been published by Taylor & Francis in the Journal of 
Critical Realism and that is available online at 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14767430.2019.1573048 
 
For example, the emergence of a new system of production of goods and services would involve 
(amongst other things) the establishment of a new relationship between parts (social structures) 
and whole (social system). Similarly, what Bhaskar calls the ‘ontogenetic emergence of 
persons’, in Chapter 3.5 of ECS, is a process that depends on a relationship between parts 
(persons) and whole (society) (69). Therefore, to look at how something new has emerged is to 
examine the process of emergence from its synchronic aspect. However, this argument 
presupposes that emergence must be a continuous process because, to look at how something 
new comes to be, is to look at it at a specific point in time. Hence, the continuity of emergence 
– the fact that, as a process, it is ongoing – is its diachronic aspect.  
 
Of course, it is true that, in the case of social reality, structures can still exist, even if the 
properties that constitute them as causal objects have not been realized through the exercise of 
human agency. For example, during a strike of labour, capitalist relations of production 
continue to exist, even though the mechanisms with which they are associated (production of 
commodities, appropriation and distribution of surplus value, etc.) have not been activated. 
However, we know these relations still exist because their pre-existence (as products of the 
exercise of human agency in the past) is the condition for, and in this sense explains, the 
decision made by labourers in the present not to go to work and the decision made by capitalists 
in the present not to pay a wage to labourers who go on strike. (This is why social structures 
must be activity-dependent, as well as concept-dependent, and why there is a distinction to be 
made between social practice, or the way of working of a structure as it is reproduced through 
the exercise of human agency, and human activity.11 In other words, social practices are 
structured human activities but, since not all human activities are structured, social practices 
must be distinguished from human activities.) By contrast, the existence of other types of causal 
object does depend on the continuous activation of the object’s properties. For example, the 
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existence of water depends on an ongoing process of bonding of oxygen and hydrogen atoms. 
In short, with respect to the social realm, the continuity of emergence as a process has to be 
distinguished from the continuity of the process by which the properties that are constitutive of 
causal objects are realized. 
 
To distinguish between the synchronic and diachronic aspects of emergence, then, is to look at 
emergence from two different perspectives. To focus on its diachronic aspect is to consider it 
as a process that is embodied in a product, whereas to focus on its synchronic aspect is to 
consider it as a product that is embodied in a process. Hence, to focus on both aspects is to 
consider it as a ‘process-in-product-in-process’ (Bhaskar 2008b, 220). It follows that, to 
distinguish between synchronic and diachronic emergence is to make an analytical distinction 
and not to assume an ontological separation: it is to distinguish between two aspects of the same 
process. However, although these aspects are distinct, they are interdependent because one 
cannot exist without the other. In short, the terms synchronic and diachronic, when they are 
applied to the concept of emergence, refer to internally related aspects of emergence.  
 
Treating the synchronic and diachronic as internally related aspects of emergence enables us to 
resolve a problem in Bhaskar’s argument concerning the emergence of ideas, which he 
published in an article for the Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. In this article, 
Bhaskar conceives ideas 
 
 as explicably efficacious, dependent upon materially embodied intentional causal 
 agency … [as] emergent parts of the natural world system and constituted within and 
 contained by all four planes of naturalised social being … [as] capable of acting back 
 on the materials out of which they are diachronically formed … [and as] causally and 
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 taxonomically irreducible modes of manifestation of matter, more generally nature (or 
 let us say being). (1997, 143) 
 
However, what is problematic about this argument is Bhaskar’s second point – that is, his 
explanation of ideas as ‘efficacious parts of the natural world’: 
 
 Just as a stratified world-view sustains the reality of ideas in virtue of their causal 
 efficacy, so a processual world-view allows us to sustain the emergent reality of 
 ideational forms without denying their diachronic emergence from nature. (1997, 143) 
 
Now, by the phrase ‘diachronic emergence from nature’, Bhaskar appears to be referring to the 
course of human evolution rather than the process of generating ideas through the exercise of 
the powers of the human mind (subjectivity) since the latter appears to be the meaning of the 
phrase ‘processual world-view’ – that is, ‘the naturalised process of thought (ideation)’ (1997, 
143). However, to presuppose that the emergence of ‘ideational forms’ is akin to an 
evolutionary process is to overlook the fact that the emergence of ‘ideational forms’ in the 
course of human evolution was dependent on the development of the human mind: its states 
(such as consciousness) and its inter-related, lower-order properties (realized as processes such 
as emotion, sensation, perception, cognition, imagination, recognition, attention, appreciation, 
and so on) and higher-order properties (for example, intentionality, reflexivity, intelligence, 
sentience, and sapience) by virtue of which human beings became able to organize the ideas 
that they produce.12 In short, to presuppose that the development of ideas is a self-determining 
process is to reify ideas and to contradict the alternative meaning of ‘diachronic emergence 
from nature’ that is consistent with the concept of ideation (‘The naturalised process of 
thought’). 
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Therefore, to avoid the danger of reifying ideas, we should distinguish carefully between the 
emergence of ideas by virtue of the exercise of human subjectivity and agency on the one hand 
and the evolutionary emergence of subjectivity and agency as properties of human beings on 
the other, whilst at the same time recognizing that both the emergence of ideas and the 
emergence of the capacity to develop and organize ideas have a synchronic and a diachronic 
aspect. I suggest that it is because Bhaskar has assumed that diachronic emergence is a distinct 
type of process that he has fallen into the trap of reifying ‘ideational forms’.  
 
3.4 Material, conceptual, and semiotic emergence 
I indicated above that the development of knowledge (epistemic1 emergence) presupposes the 
possibility of conceptual, in addition to material, emergence. I want to justify this claim by 
arguing that we can also differentiate the process of emergence by type of function and that, in 
this respect, we can identify the material, the conceptual, and the semiotic as three distinct forms 
of emergence. 
 
As Bhaskar argued in Chapter 3 of A Realist Theory of Science, the development of natural 
science presupposes that natural structures and their higher-order derivatives (for example, 
natural systems) emerge at a series of interconnected levels of reality (2008a, 163-85). Although 
natural causal objects have different properties, so that we can distinguish (for example) 
between physical, chemical, and biological causes, what they have in common, I suggest, is a 
material function; and it is their possession of this function that licenses our classification of 
them as material emergent entities.  
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However, social causal objects are different from natural causal objects. Unlike the latter, the 
former depend for their existence on people, and people are capable of forming ideas about 
reality through exercising their powers of subjectivity and agency. Now, the crucial implication 
of this difference, I suggest, is that social causal objects differ from natural causal objects with 
respect to the types of function that they possess. For example, some types of social entity have 
a material function, to the extent that they facilitate our interventions in material reality; 
however, other types of social entity have a conceptual rather than a material function, to the 
extent that they enable us to interpret and comprehend reality. I refer to social entities that have 
a material function as social structures and I refer to social entities that have a conceptual 
function as social superstructures. Examples of social structures include marriage, parenting, 
private ownership, markers, hierarchies, and the division of labour; examples of social 
superstructures include cultures (racism and sexism), ideologies (liberalism and neo-
liberalism), religions (Christianity and Islam), sciences (social and natural), and philosophies 
(positivism and interpretivism). However, since the development of concepts (and theories etc.) 
presupposes the making of meaning, and since we cannot make meanings without a signifier of 
some sort, we must also acknowledge the reality of social superstructures that have a semiotic 
function – for example, a language such as English – and that enable us to represent our 
conceptions of reality as concepts. Hence, social superstructures are social entities that have 
either a conceptual or a semiotic function. 
 
Now, Hartwig also distinguishes between the conceptual and the semiotic, when he tells us that 
‘concepts and signs may be incorporated in emergent conceptual and semiotic structures and 
are themselves structurally generated’ (2007, 401). However, if a concept is a form of sign, 
because it is both signifier (a word) and signified (that is, it embodies meaning), a semiotic 
superstructure must be, not an organized set of signs but an organized set of ideas about how to 
This is the accepted version of an article that has been published by Taylor & Francis in the Journal of 
Critical Realism and that is available online at 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14767430.2019.1573048 
 
make meaning.13 A language such as English, for example, is constituted by ideas about how 
to construct words (morphology), how to pronounce words (phonology), how to arrange words 
into phrases and sentences (syntax), and about what words, phrases, and sentences mean 
(semantics) – ideas that are often summarized as rules of grammar, spelling, and punctuation. 
Therefore, as organized sets of ideas about how to make meaning, semiotic superstructures, like 
conceptual superstructures, have an ideational function.  
 
I am arguing, then, that social structures may be differentiated from social superstructures on 
the basis of the type of function that they possess. In fact, both the material function of social 
structures (and their higher-order derivatives such as social systems and social formations) and 
the conceptual and semiotic functions of social superstructures may be differentiated further. 
Thus, the material function of a social system of production of goods and services is different 
from the material function of a social system of reproduction of labour power; the conceptual 
function of a cultural form such as sexism is different from the conceptual function of a 
philosophy such as positivism; and the semiotic function of a language such as English is 
different from the semiotic function of a system of mathematical symbols. 
 
However, we must remember that, although we may classify social structural forms as material 
emergent entities, by virtue of their material function, their existence is still dependent on the 
represented conceptions of them that people develop – that is, on concepts – and on the activities 
of people when they engage or transact with material reality – in short, on the exercise of human 
subjectivity and agency.14 Therefore, we should not make the mistake that crude materialists 
make: that is, of treating social structural forms as disconnected from the concepts and activities 
on which their existence depends and thus of reifying them. If we were to reify social structural 
forms, we would be guilty of ‘de-agentification’, one of Bhaskar’s ‘four modes of illicit 
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abstraction’ (2008b, 131) and, in consequence, we would be eliminating them from 
consideration as possible objects of transformation via human praxis. 
 
Similarly, we must remember that, although we may classify social superstructures as ideational 
emergent entities, by virtue of their conceptual and semiotic functions, their existence is still 
dependent on people’s engagement with material reality, via the exercise of human subjectivity 
and agency, which is structured and through which both superstructural and structural forms 
are reproduced and transformed. Therefore, we should not make the mistake that idealists make: 
that is, of severing superstructural forms from their connection to the material reality on which 
their existence depends. If we were to treat superstructural forms in this way, we would be 
guilty of ‘detotalization’, another one of Bhaskar’s ‘four modes of illicit abstraction’ (2008b, 
131) and, in consequence, we would be supposing that reality can be transformed simply by re-
conceptualizing it. 
 
My explication of the nature of conceptual emergence enables us to resolve two other problems 
in Bhaskar’s argument about the reality of ideas, which I introduced above. In his article, 
Bhaskar claims that ‘[p]aradigmatically ideas are social products or transforms’ (1997, 144). 
However, once again, there is more to be said here, not least if we want to avoid the danger of 
reification. Because people generate ideas through exercising their powers of subjectivity and 
agency (the condition for which is a natural and social context of structures and 
superstructures), if we say that ideas are social products, we are in danger, I think, of suggesting 
that the development of ideas is not dependent on the exercise of human subjectivity and 
agency; that is, we are in danger of assuming, once again, that ideas develop of their own accord 
(‘de-agentification’). Therefore, in order to avoid this problem, I suggest that we should say 
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that ideas are not social products but the product of the dialectical relationship between people 
and society. 
 
Moreover, we ought to recognize that the ideas that people produce through exercising their 
powers of subjectivity and agency constitute (fallible) understandings of the world that are 
unique to them since each human being, as Bhaskar has argued, is a ‘concrete 
universal=singular’ (2008b, 178); and it is on the basis of such understandings that people 
develop their own knowledge of the world. But the knowledge of each person has to be 
distinguished from the pre-existing, organized sets of ideas (that is, from pre-existing 
conceptual and semiotic superstructures) on which they draw, in order to exercise their powers 
of subjectivity and agency and thereby generate their own understanding and knowledge. In 
other words, ideas are not only the products of, but also the conditions for, the exercise of human 
subjectivity and agency. 
 
Finally, Bhaskar claims that ideas ‘are parts of nature or the universe, in all kinds of relations 
to other parts and the whole, neither of which can synchronically be defined independently of 
them’ (1997, 144). But, to be more precise and to avoid naturalising ideas – that is, treating 
them as if they are non-human and thus natural entities – we ought to say that ideas are 
embedded in, yet at the same time disembedded from (because they are emergent from), nature. 
As social conditions, ideas are embedded in nature because their existence depends ultimately 
on human praxis – on the conscious production of ideas through the exercise of human 
subjectivity and agency, activities by which ideas (as social conditions) are reproduced and 
transformed. However, ideas are also disembedded from nature because, as I argued above, 
social reality is characterized, not only by the existence of material emergent entities (that is, 
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structural forms) but also by the existence of ideational emergent entities (that is, superstructural 
forms).  
 
3.5 Functional and compositional emergence 
I argued above that the terms ‘material’, ‘conceptual’, and ‘semiotic’ may be used to 
differentiate emergent entities by type of function. I argued that, whereas material emergence 
is characteristic of the natural domain, conceptual and semiotic emergence, as well as material 
emergence, is characteristic of the social domain. In making this argument, I presupposed a 
further distinction between two types of emergence, and it is this distinction that I must justify. 
 
What is essential to the process of emergence in general, as Bhaskar puts it in ECS, is that 
something new develops – ‘by internal novelty or transformation’ – out of something that 
already exists so that the existence of the new entity cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms 
of, the entities in which it is rooted; that is, the emergence of the new entity has to be explained 
in terms of the ‘absenting’ of an ‘absence’ (118). However, reflection on the practice and results 
of scientific inquiry reveals that the nature of this process may vary and that it is necessary to 
distinguish between compositional emergence and functional emergence. My claim in this sub-
section is that the emergence of structural entities and their higher-order derivatives is 
compositional, whereas the emergence of superstructural entities is functional.15 
 
Compositional emergence, which, by implication, is characteristic of both the natural and social 
domains of reality, has the following characteristics. 
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First, the entity that emerges is a whole that constitutes a level of reality that is distinct from the 
level of reality that is constituted by its parts. What this means is that the whole exists at a 
higher level of reality than the level at which the parts exist but that the two levels are adjacent 
since, if the whole is to emerge from the parts, it must be rooted in them.16 For example, a social 
structure (a whole) exists at a higher level of reality than its parts (people), a social system (a 
whole) exists at a higher level of reality than its parts (social structures), and so on.17 
 
Second, the existence of the whole is dependent on dialectical relations between the parts – that 
is, on material entities that are distinct from, yet connected to, each other. For example, it is 
arguable that Marx’s analysis of the capitalist system of production presupposes that the 
production and distribution of surplus value depends on, at a minimum, dialectical relations 
between private ownership of the means of production, market-based exchange of goods, 
services, and money, hierarchical control of the labour process, and the re-division of labour. 
 
Third, the emergence of the whole depends on a process of ‘transformative negation’ in the 
sense that either (a) pre-existing wholes become the parts of a new whole or (b) the parts of a 
pre-existing whole become the parts of a new whole (Bhaskar 2008b, 23). Whether (a) or (b) 
applies, the content of the entity that becomes the part is modified. For example, the social 
structure of common ownership of the means of production in land, which existed as an 
emergent whole during the era of feudalism, became part of the capitalist system of production 
and, in doing so, was transformed into the social structure of private ownership of the means of 
production in land. 
 
Note that the process of transformative negation may be (amongst other things) ‘total or partial’ 
(Bhaskar 2008b, 5-6).18 For example, the transformation of the feudal system of production into 
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the capitalist system of production was partial because, although the content of the mechanisms 
at the level of the system changed (and, by implication, the content of the mechanisms at the 
levels of social structure and social formation), the mode of production, which depended on one 
class (the minority of a population) oppressing and exploiting another class (the majority), did 
not. By contrast, total social transformation of a class-based system of production would 
involve, not only a change in the content of the mechanisms at the levels of social structure, 
system, and formation (and beyond) but also the elimination of a mode of production that 
depends on the oppression and exploitation of one class by another. 
 
Fourth, the emergence of the whole depends on a process of causal interdependence in the 
sense that (a) whole and parts are distinct, irreducible, causal objects and (b) the whole cannot 
exist without the parts – that is, the parts ‘causally codetermine each other, and so causally … 
codetermine the whole’ – and the parts cannot exist without the whole – that is, the ‘form or 
structure of the combination, causally determines the elements’; in other words, there is ‘holistic 
causality’ (Bhaskar 2008b, 127). For example, it is arguable that under capitalism the 
production and distribution of surplus value are mechanisms pertaining to the systemic level of 
social reality; and that, as such, they are distinct from, and therefore irreducible to, the 
mechanisms pertaining to the social structures of ownership, exchange, control, and work on 
which their existence depends. It is only through the transformative negation of these social 
structures (amongst others), and through their dialectical relations, that the classes of capitalist 
and worker emerge and thus the production and distribution of surplus value on a capitalist 
basis becomes possible.  
 
Fifth, it follows that the emergence of the whole is dependent on a process of structuration – 
that is, the formation of structures and their higher-order derivatives at distinct levels of reality. 
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For example, within the social domain, structuration might involve the organization of different 
people into social structures (marriage, civil partnership, etc.), the organization of different 
social structures into social systems (the system of reproduction of labour power, the system of 
government, etc.), the organization of different social systems into social formations (capitalist, 
etc.), and so on. In short, the structuration of reality is intrinsic to both the stratification and 
differentiation of reality. 
 
Reflection on the nature of compositional emergence enables us to clarify the argument that 
Bhaskar makes in Chapter 3.5 of ECS concerning the distinction between human beings and 
human agents. There Bhaskar writes: 
 
 the distinction between the person and the agent … is an ontological distinction, but it 
 reflects the real ontological distinction between a thing and its circumstances such that 
 we explain the behaviour of the thing by reference to its nature and the conditions in 
 which it finds itself. (69) 
 
What is confusing about this passage is that, although ‘the person and the agent’ are analytically 
distinct, this distinction is not a reflection of ‘the real ontological distinction between a thing 
and its circumstances’; rather, it is a reflection of the existential distinction between a laminated 
system or ‘laminated structuratum’ – that is, a person – and the emergent property that is (in 
part) defining of that system or ‘structuratum’ – that is, human agency (Bhaskar 2008b, 404).19  
 
Now, it is vital to understand that a system and its essential property are internally related so 
that, when we speak of the existential distinction between them, we do so in recognition of the 
difference that exists between a system and its essential properties, which we can identify 
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analytically, but in full acknowledgement that a system and its properties are inseparable.20 In 
fact, the point that Bhaskar is making here, which is about distinguishing ‘between a thing and 
its circumstances’ and which he appears to confuse with the distinction between a system and 
its properties, is surely more relevant to the argument of Chapter 3.5 (ii) of ECS (‘The 
ontological asymmetry between societies and persons’). For example, Bhaskar goes on to write 
that ‘we can imagine the same person in different social orders’ (69). We can do; but we can 
also imagine different people in the same social order. Either way, we are making an analytical 
distinction between a specific social role (for example, secondary school teacher) and the 
specific persons who occupy that role in respect of an existential distinction. Yet it is our 
experience of negotiating social reality through interacting with different people in ‘different 
social orders’ that reminds us that society and people are inseparable. Hence, existential 
distinction is not the same as existential separation. In short, to define a ‘social actor’, as 
Bhaskar does in Chapter 3.4 of ECS, is to presuppose both the existential distinction and the 
connection of the social and the personal (67). 
 
Now, functional emergence, which, by implication, is characteristic only of the social domain 
of reality, has the following characteristics. 
 
First, the entity that emerges is a whole that constitutes a level of reality that is functional to the 
specific material entities over which it imposes itself and which emerge at a lower level of 
reality. For example, the cultures of sexism and racism are conceptual superstructural forms 
that are functional, respectively, to the contingently embedded social structures of gender and 
ethnicity; as such, sexism and racism exist at a level of reality that is higher than the level at 
which the (more general) social structures of gender and ethnicity, and the (more specific) social 
structures in which they are contingently embedded, emerge.21  
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 Second, because the parts of a functionally emergent whole are ideas, the existence of the 
whole is dependent on logical relations between its parts. For example, it is arguable that 
Marxist political economy (another type of conceptual superstructure) is constituted by 
concepts (parts) that are organized, by means of logical relations, into theories (wholes) which, 
in turn, become the parts of a new whole (a social scientific paradigm).  
 
Third, the emergence of the whole depends on a process of ‘transformative negation’ that may 
be ‘partial or total’ (Bhaskar 2008b, 5-6). For example, to the extent that, for at least part of 
human history, the content but not the function of culture, religion and ideology has changed 
(as the class-based system of production to which they are functionally related has changed 
from one type to another), the transformation of culture, religion and ideology has been partial, 
and they have remained oppressive superstructural forms. By contrast, their transformation 
would be total, if both their content and their function were to change. Thus, the total 
transformation of oppressive superstructural forms would involve, for example, the 
replacement of cultures that legitimise, and the replacement of religions that compensate for, 
material disadvantage with ones that facilitate human emancipation; it would also involve the 
replacement of ideology, which obscures the truth about social reality, with social science, 
which would provide an explanatory critique of oppressive and exploitative social structural 
and superstructural forms, and with philosophy, which would underlabour for explanatory and 
critical social theorizing. By contrast, the total transformation of science and philosophy would 
be a response to the absenting of a conceptual or theoretical absence, involving the re-
structuring of the scientific or philosophical field – that is, the expansion of a scientific or 
philosophical form;22 and, given that the function of semiotic superstructural forms is to 
facilitate the representation of conceptions of reality, partial transformation of a semiotic 
superstructure such as the English language might involve changes to the rule of grammar, 
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alongside the introduction of new word forms (as with the dialects of English), whereas total 
transformation would involve a change in how meaning is conveyed – that is, a change in the 
means of representation (which would of course entail a change in the system of representation). 
 
Fourth, the emergence of the whole depends on a process of functional interdependence. For 
example, it is arguable that the function of the structure of gender is dependent on the culture 
of sexism, whose function is to provide a rationale or justification for material inequality on the 
basis of gender difference. But, at the same time, there would be no need for this rationale or 
justification, and therefore no need for a culture of sexism, if there were no structuring of gender 
and hence the material function of the structure of gender were absent.  
 
Fifth, it follows that the emergence of the whole is dependent on a process of superstructuration 
– that is, the formation of superstructures at a distinct level of social reality. Hence, 
superstructuration is associated with the emergence of a range of functionally differentiated, 
geo-historically specific, ideational entities.23 For example, we may distinguish 
 
• cultures (such as sexism and racism) that emerged in line with the development of 
specific types of social structure (gender and ethnicity) and that provide a rationale or 
justification for material inequality (the more favourable treatment of men over women, 
of white over black persons, etc.);24 
• religions (such as Christianity) that emerged in line with the development of a specific 
type of social formation (that is, class-based) and that offer compensation (the 
forgiveness of sins etc.) for the effects of the oppression and exploitation of one class 
by another;25 
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• ideologies (such as classical liberalism and neo-liberalism) that emerged in line with the 
development of a specific type of social system (the capitalist system of production) and 
that promote a distorted understanding of this system (as a realm of individual freedom), 
concealing its real nature as a system of political oppression (via the state) and economic 
exploitation (via the circuit of capital);26 
• social sciences (such as Marxist political economy) that emerged in response to the 
oppressive effects of culture, religion and ideology, and that attempt to express the truth 
about society – about how it works, its laws of development, etc.; 
• languages (such as English) that have developed as society has developed and that 
enable conceptions of reality to be represented and thus meaning to be made. 
 
In short, the superstructuration of reality is intrinsic to the stratification and differentiation of 
social reality.  
 
Summarizing the difference between compositional and functional emergence, then, we might 
say that the crucial difference between them is that, in the former case, the entity is emergent 
by virtue of its composition, whereas, in the latter case, the entity is emergent by virtue of its 
function. In both cases, the emergent entity is an irreducible whole that constitutes a distinct 
level of reality. However, in the case of compositional emergence, the whole is a material entity 
that is emergent by virtue of dialectical relations between its parts and has properties that are 
distinct from, and thus irreducible to, the properties of its parts. By contrast, in the case of 
functional emergence, the whole is an ideational entity that is emergent by virtue of its 
functional relationship to a specific material context, it is constituted by logical relations 
between its parts, and its ideational function is irreducible to the material function of the entities 
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over which it imposes itself. However, it is still a causal object because, as an emergent, pre-
existing whole, it makes a difference to the exercise of human subjectivity and agency and thus 
to the realization of the properties of the material entities to which it is functionally related. For 
example, pre-existing superstructural forms such as sexism and racism are the conditions for, 
and thus the cause of, the social practice of organizing the division of labour on the basis of 
gender and ethnic difference; and, of course, it is through such practices that (a) the structures 
of gender and ethnicity, (b) the division of labour in which they are contingently embedded, 
and (c) the superstructural forms justifying the unequal treatment of people on the basis of 
gender and ethnic difference – that is, sexism and racism – are reproduced. 
 
What all this means is that, in the case of compositional emergence, the parts exist at a lower 
level of reality than the whole, whereas, in the case of functional emergence, parts and whole 
exist at the same level of reality, a difference that is explained by the material nature of 
compositionally emergent entities and the ideational nature of functionally emergent entities. 
This difference also explains why the emergence of material entities depends on causal 
interdependence, whereas the emergence of ideational entities depends on functional 
interdependence. However, despite these differences and in both cases, the emergence (or 
disemergence) of the whole depends on a process of transformative negation, which (amongst 
other things) may be partial or total, according to which elements of the whole are transformed. 
In short, functional emergence is defined by a relationship between entities that have distinct, 
irreducible functions, whereas compositional emergence is defined by a relationship of parts to 
whole, where the existence of the whole is dependent on, yet irreducible to, the parts. 
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3.6 Super-impositional and intra-positional emergence  
In their discussion of the process of emergence in Chapter 7 of IW, the authors distinguish 
between ‘two forms of emergence’, one of which they identify as ‘superimposition emergence’ 
and which they argue is ‘the idea that the emergent level is the superstructure’ (60). In doing 
so, the authors appear to be drawing on Bhaskar’s understanding of emergence. For example, 
in Chapter 2 of Dialectic, Bhaskar defines ‘superstructuration’ as ‘the superimposition … of 
the emergent level on … the pre-existing one’ (2008b, 49).  
 
However, both the authors’ definition of ‘superimposition emergence’ and Bhaskar’s definition 
of ‘superstructuration’ are problematic. The problem with the former is the tacit assumption 
that what is superimposed can be only a superstructure. This assumption is unjustifiable 
because, as my analysis of compositional and functional emergence demonstrates, what is 
superimposed can be either a structural or a superstructural form. Hence, the problem with the 
latter definition is that the ‘superimposition’ of an emergent level of reality is associated not 
only with superstructuration but also with structuration. In short, in both cases the definition is 
too restrictive: it is the product of an illicit assumption of identity between superimposition 
emergence and superstructuration. 
 
The second form of emergence that the authors of IW identify is ‘intra-position emergence’, 
which they conceive as ‘the idea that the emergent level is formed within the more basic level’ 
(60). Once again, in doing so, the authors appear to be drawing on Bhaskar’s understanding of 
emergence. For example, in Chapter 2 of Dialectic, Bhaskar defines ‘intrastructuration’ as ‘the 
intra-position … of the emergent level … within the pre-existing one’ (2008b, 49).  
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However, once again, both the authors’ definition of ‘intra-position emergence’ and Bhaskar’s 
definition of ‘intrastructuration’ are problematic. The problem with the former is the explicit 
assumption that what is formed within a ‘more basic level’ is an emergent level. This is 
problematic because, as the authors admit in their discussion of the essential requirements for 
emergence, an emergent level of reality must be a higher level of reality than the level from 
which it emerges.27 As my analysis of compositional and functional emergence demonstrates, 
this is the case whether the emergent entity is material or ideational. Moreover, what is 
problematic about Bhaskar’s definition of ‘intrastructuration’ and, by implication, the authors’ 
definition of ‘intra-position emergence’, is that it fails to distinguish between structuration and 
superstructuration. As we have seen, these are distinct processes, pertaining to distinct types of 
emergent entity. In short, these definitions are problematic to the extent that (a) they are 
conceptually incoherent – that is, they depend on a misunderstanding of what is essential to the 
process of emergence – and (b) they presuppose an illicit identity between intra-position 
emergence and intrastructuration. 
 
The solution to the problem of defining ‘intra-position emergence’, I suggest, is to think, not of 
the emergence of a specific level but of the emergence of a specific entity within a pre-existing 
level of reality – that is, to think of ‘intra-position emergence’ as entailing the nesting or 
embedding of emergent entities. For example, the authors of IW refer to Parker’s ‘conception 
of ecological emergence’, which they summarize in Table 6.1 (49).28 Re-conceptualizing 
Parker’s argument as the nesting of emergent entities rather than the emergence of levels, we 
might say that ‘life-support systems’ are nested within ‘cosmological systems’ (such as the 
solar system) because not all such systems are capable of sustaining life and we might also say 
that ‘human material systems’ are nested within life-support systems since human beings are 
only a subset of all forms of life on planet earth. However, we cannot say that ‘human social 
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systems’ are nested within human material systems because social (structural) systems exist at 
a higher level of reality than human beings do. Similarly, we cannot say that ‘human cultural 
systems’ are nested within human social systems because, once again, cultural systems exist at 
a higher level of reality than social (structural) systems do. However, we can say that human 
social systems are nested within the social domain of reality because not everything that is 
social is a system; and we can say that subsidiary cultures, such as hetero-sexism, are nested 
within primary cultures, such as sexism, in acknowledgement of the existence of different 
varieties of sexism. 
 
Therefore, ‘intra-position emergence’ ought to be understood as the emergence of material and 
ideational entities within a pre-existing level or domain of reality. Hence, ‘intra-position 
emergence’ entails the differentiation of a pre-existing level or domain of reality; and since it 
is material and ideational emergent entities that are intra-posed, it may be seen as depending on 
the processes of both structuration and superstructuration (as I have defined these terms above). 
Moreover, if structuration is the condition for the emergence of material entities and 
superstructuration is the condition for the emergence of ideational entities, I suggest that we 
should understand the emergence of material and ideational entities within a pre-existing level 
or domain of reality as dependent on a process of intrastructuration. In other words, 
‘superstructuration and intrastructuration’ are not, as Hartwig claims, ‘aspects of the same 
process of emergence’ (2007, 257); rather, superstructuration and, by implication, structuration 
should be seen as constellationally contained within intrastructuration. 
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4. Transfactuality: causation 
In Chapter 2.4 of ECS, Bhaskar discusses the concept of emergence, and states that ‘three 
criteria’ must be satisfied for a situation to be considered as constituting synchronic emergence 
(32). The first criterion is the ‘unilateral dependence of the higher-order or emergent level on 
the lower level’; the second is the ‘taxonomic and causal irreducibility of higher-order 
properties or powers to lower-order ones in the domain of the higher order’; and the third is the 
‘causal irreducibility of higher-order powers in the domain of the lower order. This is top-down 
causation’ (32).  
 
Now, whereas the first and second criteria are perfectly plausible, the third criterion, which 
touches on the question of causation and hence presupposes the concept of transfactuality (since 
causal objects have effects in both closed and open systems), is more problematic. The first 
point to make in this respect is that, given what Bhaskar says in support of the third criterion, it 
would make more sense to revise his statement of it and replace ‘causal irreducibility’ with 
‘causal effectivity’ because here it seems that Bhaskar is thinking of the possibility of a higher-
order entity having effects on entities lying at lower levels of reality; indeed, one of the 
examples that Bhaskar offers in the accompanying text, of human intervention in nature via 
‘agriculture and industry’, is entirely appropriate in this respect (32). However, the other 
example that Bhaskar gives, of the effects of climate change, points to the converse causal 
relationship – that is, where properties at lower levels of reality have effects (through 
precipitation and flooding, for example) on entities (persons, for example) at higher levels of 
reality (32); and one can envisage a third possibility, where properties of entities lying within 
the same level of reality have effects on each other. In short, in addition to ‘top-down causation’ 
we also ought to recognize the possibility of ‘bottom-up causation’ and ‘sideways causation’. 
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Whether the direction of the causal process is ‘top-down’, ‘bottom-up’ or ‘sideways’, each is a 
type of causation that, elsewhere, I have defined as causal influence (or interaction, if the 
process if two-way).29 Now, the possibility of causal interaction involving entities lying either 
at the same or at different levels of reality presupposes that reality is characterized by both 
compositional and functional emergence because both the material entities that emerge through 
compositional emergence and the ideational entities that emerge through functional emergence 
are causal objects. For example, at the social systemic level, the operation of the system of 
government can affect, through the passing of legislation, the operation of the systems of 
production of goods and services and the reproduction of labour power, while a conceptual 
system such as ideology can interact with a conceptual system such as social science to produce 
confusion at the level of personal understanding. In the former example, causal interaction 
depends on the exercise of human agency; in the latter example, it depends on the exercise of 
human subjectivity. 
 
However, the crucial point that I want to make here is that, if causal influence presupposes 
compositional and functional emergence, we cannot use this concept in our definitions of 
emergence. As I argued in Section 3, what is essential to compositional emergence is (amongst 
other things) causal interdependence – that is, causal dependence between structures and their 
higher-order derivatives – while what is essential to functional emergence is (amongst other 
things) functional interdependence – that is, the dependence of the ideational function of a 
superstructural form (such as sexism) on the material function of a structural form (gender 
difference), and vice versa. In short, by referring to ‘top-down causation’ in the third criterion 
for emergence, Bhaskar mis-specifies the type of causal relationship that is the condition for 
compositional emergence and overlooks the type of functional relationship that is the condition 
for functional emergence. 
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It is important, therefore, that we are mindful of the distinction between compositional and 
functional emergence, when we engage with Bhaskar’s definition of ‘dual, multiple, complex 
and open control’ in Chapter 2 of Dialectic. According to Bhaskar, a situation of ‘dual, multiple, 
complex and open control’ is one in which the ‘higher-order agencies set the boundary 
conditions for the operation of lower-order laws’ and the lower level ‘provides the framework 
principles for, or conditions of possibility of, the “higher” level’ (2008b, 53). We should 
remember, for example, that the ‘higher-order agencies’ may be either superstructural forms, 
such as cultures, or higher-level structural forms, such as social systems, while the lower-level 
entities, in both cases, must be structural forms. That said, the distinction between 
compositional and functional emergence is still consistent with the fact that ‘dual, multiple, 
complex and open control’ depends on what Hartwig calls ‘multi-level determination’, which 
is distinct from, although at the same time the condition for, ‘[m]ultiple determination’ – that 
is, ‘the totality of causal forces co-operating to produce a result’ – so that the multiple 
determination of events constellationally embraces multiple control (2007, 122-23). It is still 
consistent with the multiple determination of events because, to repeat the point that I made 
above, both structural and superstructural forms are causal objects and thus distinct forms of 
determination. 
 
Note that causal dependence between entities lying at adjacent levels of reality is the 
presupposition of Bhaskar’s ontological argument, in Chapter 3.5 of ECS, that ‘societies and 
persons’ are asymmetrical. In making this argument, Bhaskar refers to the first criterion for 
emergence that he introduces in Chapter 2.4, as well as to a fourth criterion: 
 
 In section 3.3 I argued that there is an ontological asymmetry between the personal 
 and the social, such that the social is existentially dependent upon the personal, just as 
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 the personal is existentially or emergently dependent upon the biological, whereas the 
 social is not existentially, but rather only contextually and developmentally dependent 
 on the personal. This existential dependence reflects criterion (i) of emergence, the 
 bottom-up unilateral existential dependence of higher-order properties and strata upon 
 lower-order ones, while the contextual and developmental dependence reflects 
 criterion (iv), that is, the causal irreducibility, or top-down or downwards causation, 
 of the higher upon the lower … (68-9; my emphasis) 
 
However, once again, Bhaskar’s argument at this point is somewhat problematic. If ‘the social 
is existentially dependent upon the personal’, it cannot also be the case that ‘the social is not 
existentially, but rather only contextually and developmentally dependent on the personal.’ 
Given the necessity for the causal interdependence of entities at adjacent levels of reality (in 
this case, persons at one level and society at another), it must be the case that the personal is 
contextually and developmentally dependent on the social. The personal is contextually 
dependent in the sense that a person is subject, typically, to determination by multiple social 
forces so that the context of a person’s decision making tends to vary; and it is developmentally 
dependent in the sense that a person learns about society typically through making mistakes and 
in this way develops an understanding of the social constraints on the fulfilment of human needs 
– the ‘proactive ontogenetic emergence of persons’, as Bhaskar puts it (69). 
 
The second problem with the extract above concerns the reference to the criteria for emergence. 
Bhaskar tells us that ‘contextual and developmental dependence reflects criterion (iv), that is, 
the causal irreducibility, or top-down or downwards causation, of the higher upon the lower’. 
In Chapter 2.4 of ECS, Bhaskar specifies this criterion as criterion (iii), not criterion (iv), since 
the latter is concerned with something else – that is, the enfolding of a higher level of reality 
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within a lower level (its unfolding, in the right conditions, being the emergence of the higher 
level, one presumes). However, criterion (iii) is not the relevant criterion to invoke at this point 
because, as I have just argued, criterion (iii) is concerned with the causal effectivity of a higher-
order entity on a lower-order entity – that is, ‘top-down causation’. Therefore, if the idea of the 
contextual and developmental dependence of the personal upon the social is to make sense, the 
relevant form of causation to which we should refer is the causal dependence of the personal 
upon the social. 
 
It should also be acknowledged that, although Bhaskar refers to ‘downwards causation’ in 
Chapter 3.6, he uses this term in the sense that I have defined – that is, as presupposing causal 
dependence between adjacent levels of reality – not in the sense of criterion (iii) in Chapter 2.4. 
That said, Bhaskar’s explanation of ‘downwards causation’ at this point is also confusing.30 He 
tells us that ‘one can think of it as the higher-order level affecting the initial and boundary 
conditions for the operation of lower-order laws’ (73). However, it would make more sense in 
my view to replace ‘affecting’ with ‘setting’ – as is Bhaskar’s way of explaining the concept of 
multiple control in Dialectic – because ‘affecting’ (in this context) is more suggestive of causal 
effectivity or influence, whereas the relevant mode of causation under consideration at this point 
in the text of ECS is causal dependence. 
 
What all this entails is the need to reformulate criterion (iii) so that it takes into account the 
difference between compositional and functional emergence – for example, 
 
 (iii) the causal or functional dependence of the higher-order level on the lower-order 
 level and, vice versa, the causal or functional dependence of the lower-order level on 
 the higher-order level. 
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Having re-formulated this criterion, we would be in a stronger position to argue that an 
emergent reality is the condition for the multiple determination of events and states of affairs 
and that this necessitates, within the practice of scientific inquiry, both theoretical or abstract 
explanation, to uncover the reality of causal objects at different levels, and applied or concrete 
explanation, to understand precisely which of these objects is involved in generating an event 
or state of affairs of interest. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this article, I have proposed solutions to a range of conceptual problems that I have detected, 
using the method of immanent critique, in the arguments of ECS, IW and associated works. Let 
me summarize the nature of these problems and how I have attempted to resolve them. 
 
In Section 2, I identified, in Chapters 1 to 3 of ECS and Chapter 4 of IW, a problem of confusion 
stemming from the illicit identification of the concept of stratification with the concepts of 
depth, structuration and emergence, and the principle of non-identity. I suggested that we might 
avoid this problem by making a clear analytical distinction between these concepts and this 
principle, whilst at the same time recognizing (where necessary) the connections between them. 
 
In Section 3, I identified a problem of confusion concerning the concept of emergence that 
Bhaskar discusses in Chapter 2 of ECS and that the authors of IW discuss in Chapter 7. I argued 
that this problem stems from (a) the absence of the terms epistemological and ontic, which 
should be paired with ontological emergence and epistemic emergence, respectively, and (b) 
the illicit split of the diachronic from the synchronic. In other words, I argued that, whereas the 
terms ontological and epistemological qualify the concept of emergence and the terms ontic 
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and epistemic refer to distinct, yet connected, types of emergence, the terms synchronic and 
diachronic refer to distinct, yet interdependent, aspects of emergence.  
 
I also argued that the problem of confusion concerning the concept of emergence stems from 
an absence of the concept of functional emergence (and the associated concepts of functional 
interdependence and superstructuration), which should be distinguished from compositional 
emergence (and the associated concepts of causal interdependence and structuration) and which 
entails the emergence of ideational (conceptual and semiotic) rather than material entities. 
Moreover, I suggested that an understanding of the difference between compositional and 
functional emergence can help us to resolve the confusion in Bhaskar’s argument in Chapter 3 
of ECS about the difference between human beings and human agents.  
 
In the final part of Section 3, I argued that the problem of confusion concerning the concept of 
emergence stems from the illicit identification of super-impositional emergence with 
superstructuration and of intra-positional emergence with intrastructuration, alongside a 
misunderstanding of what is essential to the process of emergence. I suggested that these 
problems might be avoided, if we were to re-conceptualize intra-positional emergence as the 
emergence of material and ideational entities within a pre-existing level or domain of reality 
and, as such, dependent on a process of intrastructuration that constellationally contains both 
structuration and superstructuration. 
 
In Section 4, I identified a problem of confusion that stems from the absence of a relevant causal 
criterion for emergence. I argued, contrary to the argument that Bhaskar presents in Chapter 2 
of ECS, that causal influence (or interaction) is not a relevant criterion to use because (a) 
compositional emergence depends on causal interdependence, not causal influence, and (b) the 
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emergence of causal objects, whether this is functional or compositional, is the condition for 
the causal interaction of entities emergent at the same or at different levels of reality. 
Furthermore, I suggested that the absence of the criterion of causal interdependence may 
explain the confusion in Bhaskar’s argument concerning the relationship between people and 
society that he presents in Chapter 3 of ECS. Thus, I argued, contra Bhaskar, that, whereas the 
social is existentially dependent on the personal, the personal is both contextually and 
developmentally dependent on the social so that, once again, the relevant causal criterion for 
emergence that applies to this relationship is causal interdependence and not causal interaction. 
 
In short, in the first article in this series, I have identified a range of conceptual problems – 
illicit conceptual identification and split, conceptual absence, and contradictory conceptual 
definition – that generate confusion at the level of philosophical argument. By identifying these 
problems, I hope to have confirmed Bhaskar’s view, which he states in ECS, that ‘the 
development of … critical realism is … a process of continuing self-critique (or metacritique)’ 
(11); and, by proposing solutions to these problems, I hope not only to have clarified but also 
to have developed the categories of original critical realism, so that critical realism as a whole 
can ‘demystify and enlighten common sense’ and thus be a more effective underlabourer for 
science. 
 
Notes 
1. Chapters 4 to 8 of IW, as the authors acknowledge in their introduction, are based on a series 
of lectures that Roy Bhaskar delivered in 2009 at Örebro University in Sweden (4). 
2. As one of the reviewers of this article pointed out, more experienced critical realists may 
have already identified and resolved in their own minds the conceptual problems that I discuss. 
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However, it would not be fair to assume that all have done so and, even if they had, there would 
still be a need for them to communicate a revised understanding to those on behalf of whom 
they are underlabouring – for example, scientists looking for solutions to problems with their 
theorizing. 
3. Bhaskar defines the method of immanent critique, in Chapter 4 of The Possibility of 
Naturalism, in relation to scientific theory: ‘[c]riticism of an account of science on theoretical 
grounds seeks either to show that the account is internally inconsistent or, if it is consistent, that 
it produces problems insuperable in its own terms’ (1998, 120). However, application of the 
method of immanent critique need not be limited to ‘accounts of science’ since it can just as 
easily be applied to accounts of the nature of reality – as Bhaskar acknowledges in Chapter 1 
of ECS, where he presents a broader definition of immanent critique. Therefore, I use this 
method as the starting point for my argument. Indeed, it is an appropriate way of identifying 
theoretical problems not least because, as Hartwig recognizes, it does not generate the problem 
of ‘“bad circularity” or arbitrariness’ that arises when one judges an account against ‘external 
criteria of knowledge’ (2007, 106); and it is for this reason that it is known as immanent critique, 
as its starting point is always ‘within the accounts it seeks to situate, correct or replace’ (2007, 
106). 
4. By the term ‘original critical realism’, I mean the first phase of development of Bhaskar’s 
system of philosophy, which, as Bhaskar tells us in Chapter 1 of ECS, ‘is itself subdivided into 
transcendental realism or critical realist philosophy of science, critical naturalism or critical 
realist philosophy of social science, and the theory of explanatory critique, which forms part of 
critical realist ethics’ (9). By the term ‘dialectical critical realism’, I mean the second phase of 
development of Bhaskar’s system of philosophy, the dialecticisation of original critical realism, 
which was necessary to make sense of the reality of change, something that Bhaskar had taken 
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for granted in the development of the first phase. Of crucial importance to the development of 
this second phase was Bhaskar’s conceptualization of absence as having ontological priority 
over presence. (See Norrie 2010.) 
Note that Bhaskar acknowledges in Chapter 1 of ECS that the term ‘critical realism’ is used to 
refer to the first phase of development as well as to the whole system of philosophy but that 
‘content determines which meaning is intended’ (9). One might ask why scholars refer to the 
system as ‘critical realism’, given that this term also refers to the combination of transcendental 
realism and critical naturalism that are parts of the first phase of development of the system. 
One possible explanation for this, I suggest, is that scholars are recognizing, implicitly, that it 
was from this combination that a whole system of philosophy emerged, with the development 
of each new phase preserving what had been essential to the development of the previous phase 
– that is, sublation that is essentially preservative (to use Hegelian terminology). 
5. Since the third phase of development of Bhaskar’s system is the philosophy of metaReality, 
it may be argued that the categories of thought that constitute both the first and second phases 
should be consistent with the categories of thought that constitute the third phase. However, 
identifying and resolving any such inconsistencies is beyond the scope of the first and second 
articles in this series, which focus on identifying and resolving problems within the theory of 
original critical realism from the vantage point of dialectical critical realism. 
6. I acknowledge that my argument depends on a specific interpretation of selected statements 
that Bhaskar has made in ECS and other works and that the authors of IW have made. Of course, 
both my selection and my interpretation may be challenged. Other scholars, for example, may 
determine that I have provided insufficient textual evidence in support of my claim to have 
identified conceptual problems in ECS and IW and/or that I have misinterpreted the intended 
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meaning of the statements that the authors of these works have made. But that sort of challenge 
is to be expected, at least if one accepts the principles of epistemic relativism and fallibilism. 
7. Note that the critical realist concept of structuration should not be confused with the concept 
of structuration that is to be found in the work of Anthony Giddens, which Archer (1995) has 
argued is an example of central conflationism and to which Bhaskar refers in Chapter 3.3 of 
ECS (53). 
8. The last of these three statements is somewhat problematic, I suggest, because, surely, what 
Bhaskar means here is that reality ‘is structured, differentiated and … susceptible to change’ 
since ontology is a theory of reality. That said, the organization of Bhaskar’s system of 
philosophy into three distinct yet connected phases (original critical realism, dialectical critical 
realism, and the philosophy of metaReality) and the subsequent development of this system of 
thought by means of immanent critique demonstrates that it could also be regarded as being 
‘structured, differentiated and … susceptible to change.’ 
9. See, for example, the result of Marx’s critical analysis of works of classical political economy 
that was published as Theories of Surplus Value.  
10. Note that, although epistemic1 and epistemic2 entities cannot fall within the domain of ontic2 
entities, they would be ontic2 entities, if they were objects of scientific inquiry – for example, 
in the sociology of science, where the process of scientific inquiry (an epistemic2 entity) is a 
legitimate object of sociological investigation.  
11. As Bhaskar puts it in Chapter 2 of Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation,  
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[a] “practice” cannot be identified either with a “structure” or with the “agency” which 
reproduces or transforms it; it is rather, as it were, the structure at work in praxis – or, to 
employ a Kantian analogy, the schema of the structure. (2009, 129) 
12. In Chapter 7 of IW, the authors refer to some of these powers in their discussion of ‘being 
as incorporating reflexivity’ (70-1). However, in my view, they confuse what they call ‘self-
conscious reflexivity’ with ‘agential intentionality’, even though these are distinct, connected 
powers of the mind. Intentionality, for example, is the ability that we have to form intentions 
regarding goals and courses of action on the basis of beliefs and drives (motivations); it is 
realized through such processes as goal setting and action planning. However, what informs the 
setting of goals and the planning of actions are the results of the exercise of reflexivity. For 
example, by comparing the actual outcomes of our praxis with what we expected to happen, we 
may identify either problems with the beliefs that (in part) motivated us to choose some courses 
of action over others or problems with the actions that we chose in relation to our beliefs and 
drives. Hence, the exercise of the power of reflexivity may prompt us to change either our 
beliefs or our chosen courses of action; it may also prompt us to change our goals. But, if 
intentionality depends on reflexivity, reflexivity depends on intentionality because we would 
have nothing to be reflexive about, if we were unable to form intentions. Therefore, 
‘contradictions between our theory and practice’ are what we identify through exercising our 
power of reflexivity; they are not, as the authors of IW seem to think they are, reflexivity as 
such. 
13. Hence, signifiers (words, symbols, pictures, gestures, etc.) are conveyors of meaning and, 
as such, should not be confused with that which is being signified. See Sayer (2000b, 35-40). 
14. I discuss the concept of human subjectivity further in the second article in this series. 
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15. Hitherto, critical realists have tended to reduce the meaning of emergence to that of 
compositional emergence. This reduction is a pervasive feature of, for example, Collier’s 
explanation of emergence and stratification in Scientific Realism and Socialist Thought, 
including in Chapter 2: 
There is one more relation between strata which must be mentioned: the relation of 
structuration or composition. Entities inhabiting one stratum will be composed of entities 
inhabiting a lower one. Societies are composed (in part, at least) of people; living cells 
are composed of molecules, and so on. (1989, 51) 
16. It is necessary to include the qualification ‘adjacent’ here because one level of reality may 
be higher (or lower) than another but the two levels need not be next to one another. In the case 
of compositional emergence, the level of the whole and the level of the parts must be next to 
one another. 
17. Some critical realists may be uncomfortable with the conceptualization of reality in terms 
of levels or layers. However, it is important to remember that the intention behind the use of 
metaphorical language in theory construction, whether this is in science or philosophy, is to try 
to express a truth about reality. Metaphorical language helps us in this respect because through 
using metaphors we say something novel about reality from the perspective of something that 
we already know (Lewis 1999). In this way, a ‘logic of analogy and metaphor’ helps us to make 
sense of the reality of the new object of interest (Bhaskar 1998, 12). Hence, my use of terms 
such as ‘level’ and ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ is intended to facilitate an understanding of the 
articulation of reality; it is not intended to suggest that reality is articulated just as a multi-storey 
building would be – that is, it is not intended to have a literal application. To assume that this 
is the intention would be to commit the linguistic fallacy: it would be to assume that there is a 
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simple identity between reality and the language that we use to describe it. Of course, from a 
critical realist perspective this is an illicit assumption because, as the history of natural science 
demonstrates, our theories about the natural world and the language in which we have 
communicated them have changed, while reality has stayed the same. If this entails that some 
metaphors are more appropriate ways of conveying meaning than others, it is for other scholars 
to propose and justify the use of alternative metaphors for describing the articulation of reality. 
18. In Chapter 1 of Dialectic, Bhaskar treats ‘transformative negation’ as a species of ‘real 
negation’ that involves ‘the transformation of some thing, property or state of affairs.’ He also 
writes: ‘Such a transformation may be essential or inessential, total or partial, endogenously 
and/or exogenously effected’ (2008b, 5-6). 
19. Human agency is of course a specific type of agency since an agent is anything that can 
bring about change in the world. 
20. Of course, none of this obviates the need to explain the ‘behaviour’ of people ‘by reference 
to … the conditions’ or ‘circumstances’ in which people make decisions; for, as we have seen, 
the personal is contextually dependent on the social. 
21. The concept of contingent embeddedness is a development of the work of Sayer (2000a). 
22. In Chapter 4.3 of ECS, Bhaskar refers to the development of knowledge via the remedying 
of a conceptual absence as the continual re-development – and thus expansion – of a ‘totality’ 
(91). 
23. Note that my intention at this point is two-fold: to suggest that ideational entities be re-
categorized as types of superstructure and to set out one way in which such entities might be 
differentiated. I am not suggesting that this is an exhaustive list and I am not suggesting that 
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one can reduce the complex process of social reproduction to the effect of any one of these 
entities. All I am claiming here is that concepts that (Marxist) social scientists have used to 
explain how societies are reproduced (such as culture, religion and ideology) refer to a higher-
order social reality (that is, to a superstructural reality), although I acknowledge that there is 
much more to say about these concepts, whether from a Marxist perspective or not. (Archer 
[1996], for example, has attempted to define the concept of culture, and to specify its distinction 
from and connection to social structure and human agency, from a realist perspective.) 
That said, my argument about the nature of social reality in this section may be interpreted as a 
contribution to the re-working of the traditional concept of superstructure that is found in 
Marx’s Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy of 1859. There Marx 
defines the superstructure of reality as (in part) political. However, as I have argued elsewhere, 
it is in the structural domain of social reality that the political is to be found (Holland 2017).  
24. I am not arguing that cultural forms such as sexism and racism are functionally emergent 
entities because they provide a justification for unequal material rewards; that is, I am not trying 
to claim that they exist to justify a specific distribution of material resources. All I am claiming 
is that sexism and racism are distinct forms of superstructure and that, as such, they are 
functional to the continuing existence of a society that is divided into classes, where one class 
dominates (or rules over) other classes. In short, my argument here is functional and not 
functionalist. 
25. Again, I am not claiming that Christianity is functionally emergent because it offers 
compensation for the effects of oppression and exploitation. I am claiming that Christianity, as 
a distinct form of religion, is a distinct type of superstructure, whose existence is functional to 
the continuing existence of class-based society. 
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26. Again, I am not claiming that ideology is functionally emergent because it promotes a 
distorted understanding of social reality – just that ideology, as a distinct type of superstructure, 
is also functional to the continuing existence of a society that is divided into classes. 
27. As the authors of IW put it in Chapter 7, 
 
 [i]n terms of emergence, one level of being will be qualitatively different from a more 
 basic level. While the higher level is unilaterally dependent on the more basic one, it is 
 nevertheless taxonomically irreducible to it. The higher level if being is also causally 
 irreducible to the basic level in the sense that it has the capacity to act back on the 
 more basic level. (60) 
 
28. See Parker (2010, 208-09). 
29. See Holland (2013, 59-62). 
30. What is also confusing about the argument in Chapter 3.6 is the relationship that Bhaskar 
specifies between ‘individualism’, ‘reductionism’ and ‘actualism’ (73). For example, on the 
one hand Bhaskar tells us that ‘individualism, abstracting from the social context in which we 
act, appears as a tacit condition of reductionism’; on the other hand he tells us that ‘sociological 
individualism is rooted in the epistemic fallacy’ (73). However, it makes more sense in my view 
(and in light of Bhaskar’s reference to Cartesian rationalism in his explanation of these 
concepts) to see reductionism as the consequence of committing the epistemic fallacy and 
sociological individualism as a specific form of reductionism. Bhaskar also tells us that, ‘[i]f 
sociological individualism is rooted in the epistemic fallacy, reductionism is a legacy of 
actualism, which tends always to a monodisciplinary or a one-dimensional approach’ (73). 
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However, once again, it makes more sense in my view to treat reductionism as the 
presupposition of actualism since what is presupposed by the meaning of actualism, as Bhaskar 
argued for the first time in Chapter 2 of A Realist Theory of Science, is the reduction of reality 
to an actuality of events and states of affairs, which is also to say that an actualist ontology 
assumes that the properties of causal objects are always realized. 
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